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Abstract
We analyze affirmative action in the presence of income heterogeneity, with
the target group containing a creamy layer, as well as poorer members. We
find that a move from identity to class-based affirmative action would affect the
creamy layer and the poorer members of the target group differently. While it
would help the poorer members of the target group, it would hurt the creamy
layer, as well as the non-target group. Further, temporary affirmative action
need not have a permanent effect, since removing identity-based affirmative
action may harm the poorer members of the target group. Thus either remov-
ing identity-based affirmative action, or switching to a class-based affirmative
action is likely to be politically difficult.
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1 Introduction
Many countries adopt affirmative action policies in favour of traditionally under-
privileged groups, with the list of countries practicing some form of affirmative ac-
tion including, among others, the US, Canada, India, South Africa, New Zealand,
Malaysia, China, Israel, and Sri Lanka.1 In this paper we focus on an aspect of
affirmative action that has been relatively under-researched in the literature, namely
the fact that the intended beneficiaries typically contain people with very different
income levels, including the so called “creamy layer”. Furthermore, over time more
and more members of the target groups have been entering the creamy layer, so that
the issue of income heterogeneity among the target group is gaining in relevance.2
We compare and contrast two alternative forms of affirmative action, identity and
class-based, in the presence of income heterogeneity. While affirmative action has
traditionally been identity-based, class-based affirmative action is being debated, as
well as implemented (at least in certain sectors), in several countries. The reservation
policy in India for example, while predominantly based on caste, does take some ac-
count of class in that there is a cutoff income so that any potential ‘Other Backward
Caste’ (henceforth OBC) beneficiary with income exceeding the cutoff is excluded.3
Reece (2011) describes how, in the US, affirmative action in government contracting
has been moving away from race-based preferential treatment to that based on eco-
nomic criteria. Programs like HUBZone and TACPA award contracts preferentially
to small business owners in socioeconomically disadvantaged areas, whose employees
1Affirmative action has been used since the 1960s in the US, with race and sex being part
of hiring criteria. Similarly the Canadian Employment Equity Act gives preferences to women,
aboriginals, and minorities. In India, caste is a basis for reservation in government jobs and publicly
funded educational institutions. In South Africa, the Employment Equity Act of 1998 mandated
that companies with more than 50 employees must meet proportional quotas in their hiring of
disadvantaged groups. In New Zealand affirmative action has given those of Maori descent better
access to university and financial aid since 1993. Brazil has quotas for racial minorities and the
poor in higher education.
2Poverty levels among African-Americans in the US, for example, have fallen sharply over the
last 50 years, from 41.8% in 1966, to 27.2% in 2012 (Pew Research Center, January 2014). In
India, poverty rates among the scheduled castes, beneficiaries of affirmative action, fell from 62.4%
in 1993-94, to 31.5% in 2011-12. Similarly, poverty rates among the other beneficiaries of Indian
affirmative action, namely scheduled tribes and other backward castes (OBCs), declined by over
17 percentage points between 2003-04 and 2011-12, as opposed to an 11.6% decline for non-target
groups (Business Standard, March 14, 2014, and also Times of India, May 5, 2015). Hnatkovska et
al. (2012) and Deshpande and Ramachandran (2014) examine divergence along other dimensions
as well, and reach conclusions with a similar flavour.
3In India, the National Commission for Backward Classes has proposed a ceiling of Rs 10.5 lakh
in 2015.
are mainly economically disadvantaged youth (Reece 2011). Moreover, many coun-
tries that have affirmative action in college admissions give at least some weight to
income. Examples include Brazil,4 France,5 Israel,6 New Zealand7 and South Africa.8
We are interested in several key questions that are germane to the political econ-
omy of affirmative action. In order to pose these issues sharply, we consider a society
that is divided along both identity and class lines, in particular we examine a society
consisting of three groups of workers, the (rich) whites, the poor blacks, and the
creamy layer blacks.9
First, we examine the effects of a switch from identity to income-based affirmative
action. If the objective of the government is to help the poor blacks, then such a pol-
icy may be more effective in achieving this target. While speaking about inequality
in India, for example, Thomas Piketty said “... the long-term objective should be to
gradually move away from a caste-based reservation system to a system of reserva-
tion that is more based on parental income, parental wealth.”10 Further, given that
income disparity among the target groups are declining in several countries, some of
the gains from affirmative action may go to the increasingly aﬄuent and increasingly
larger creamy layer blacks as long as it is identity based. How would such a switch to
income based affirmative action affect the utility of the various groups?11 Answering
4In Brazil, quotas for the poor coexist with those for racial minorities in federal univer-
sities and in some civil service jobs (the Economist, April 26, 2013). It is attempting to
implement an affirmative action policy in college admissions that is both race-conscious and
class-based. In particular the admission policy is considering whether applicants have public
school backgrounds and are from poor families, while also ensuring a certain racial mix (see
http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20160419134316317).
5Highly-ranked French schools are required to maintain quotas for students from poorer families
(Le Monde, December 17, 2008).
6In Israel four elite universities implemented a programme of class-based affirmative action that
ignored racial and ethnic criteria (Alon 2011). At the same time, from 2008 onwards, a proportion
of seats in the Israeli civil service was reserved for Arabs (Haaretz, 2nd April, 2010).
7In New Zealand, some universities which traditionally had quotas for students of Maori ethnic-
ity began considering also giving preference to economically disadvantaged students, regardless of
ethnicity (see http://mauistreet.blogspot.in/2013/06/affirmative-action-class-or-ethnicity.html).
8In South Africa universities in Cape Town have started to consider whether children of impov-
erished black families should be treated the same way as children of more aﬄuent blacks, and have
begun to incorporate both racial and family background considerations in their admission policies
(see http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20160419134316317).
9This is not to say that there is no income heterogeneity among ‘whites’, but just that poverty
is relatively more of a concern among the ‘blacks’.
10See http://www.livemint.com/Politics/sAAIiM843JTZDuTCzZWpZO/Thomas-Piketty–
India-has-a-very-strong-legacy-of-extreme-i.html.
11Interestingly, sometimes class has been used as proxy for identity based affirmative action. In
the US, when colleges were forbidden from explicit use of race-based quotas for admissions, some
2
this question would help us understand how different groups are going to react to
any such attempted switch.
Second, following Coate and Loury (1993), one can ask if a temporary affirmative
action policy is likely to have a permanent effect or not. This is important given
that continuation of affirmative action over a long period can have serious costs,
including a possible backlash from the non-target groups.12 In particular is it possible
that unlike in Coate and Loury (1993) removal of affirmative action can generate a
worse labour market outcome for the poor black workers? If so, then once enforced,
affirmative action policies may be difficult to remove as doing so would entail serious
political costs.
Following Arrow (1972) and Coate and Loury (1993), we examine a model where
the employers receive an imperfect signal regarding the skill level of all workers. Fur-
ther, the poor black workers have higher opportunity costs of investing in education
relative to the whites, as well as the creamy layer blacks. This may arise because of
various reasons that we discuss later in the paper. The belief of the firms regarding
any worker is conditioned both by this signal, as well as their perception regarding
the average skill level of the concerned group. Based on this belief they assign work-
ers to either a skilled job (with higher wages), or to an unskilled one. The workers, in
turn, may or may not acquire the requisite skill depending on their own costs of doing
so, as well as on the belief that the employers have about their group. Consequently,
the equilibrium may display statistical discrimination and stereo-typing.
Next turning to the results, we demonstrate that there can be multiple equilibria,
and examine conditions under which an equilibrium with stereo-typing, and even
patronization (whereby the target groups are held to a lower standard) may, or may
not exist. We also establish that equilibrium utility levels are closely tied to labour
market outcomes.
The interaction between identity based stereo-typing and target group hetero-
geneity gives rise to interesting new polarisations. Critically, the investment deci-
sions, and consequently the interests, of the members of the creamy layer and the
white workers, may get aligned to a certain extent, since both these groups would
find their investment decisions relatively less affected by income constraints vis-a-vis
the poor black workers. This in turn may mean that the interests of the poor blacks
colleges began using “class-based” affirmative action (Sander 1997). However, following an adverse
US Supreme Court ruling in 2003, class-based affirmative action has not been widely implemented.
12In the Indian state of Gujarat, for example, the relatively wealthy and upwardly mobile com-
munity of “Patels” have started an agitation for OBC status, which would entitle them to benefit
from affirmative action (The Hindu, 26th August, 2015). The agitation not only led to arson and
destruction of public property, but also widespread violence and even death. Similarly, the Jat
community in Haryana, and the Gujjars in Rajasthan, are also demanding OBC status in India.
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differ from those of the creamy layer, even though both benefit from affirmative ac-
tion. We then argue that any attempt to either repeal such policies, or to replace
identity based policies with class based ones, may face political obstacles as these
may worsen the labour market outcome for one group or the other.
We find that if an income based affirmative action policy were to replace an
identity-based one, then all creamy layer blacks are worse off in that they are assigned
to the skilled task with its higher wages at a lower rate. This in turn implies that
all creamy layer black workers have a greater utility under income-based affirmative
action. This is intuitive given that creamy layer blacks will cease to be beneficiaries
if affirmative action is class based. Interestingly, given some regularity conditions,
all poor black workers fare strictly better, while all white workers are strictly worse
off in terms of both labour market outcomes and their utility.
This suggests that if the objective of affirmative action is to help the poor blacks,
then class-based affirmative action is more apt. However, the political economy of
such a switch is clearly complex. The analysis suggests that blacks may find it
difficult to present a unified stand in support of such a switch, given that creamy
layer blacks are unlikely to support such a move. Of course, white workers are also
unlikely to favour such a move.13
In fact, even if the outcome involves patronisation, so that firms hold poor black
workers to a lower standard because of pessimistic beliefs about their skills, we find
that creamy layer blacks still fare worse under class-based affirmative action. The
interests of whites and poor blacks would diverge in that one group benefits and one
group gets hurt by a transition from an identity-based to a class-based policy. Thus,
irrespective of whether the equilibrium involves patronisation or not, such a policy
switch is unlikely to find support from all groups.
Moreover, unlike Coate and Loury (1993), we find that the removal of affirmative
action, whether identity-based or income-based, can generate a worse labour market
outcome for poor black workers. This is more likely if poor black workers form a
significant proportion of all black workers, suggesting that once enforced, affirmative
action policies may be difficult to remove as doing so would entail serious political
costs. Thus temporary affirmative action policy is unlikely to have a permanent
effect.
Finally, we examine how the introduction of affirmative action affects the three
13In this context we note that several authors, including Jackson (1987), Nelson and Meranto
(1977) and Wilson (1978), find that blacks may fail to present a united front politically, and some
of the fault lines may be class-based. For example, Jackson (1987) finds that a black mayoral
candidate received overwhelming support from the poorer segments of the black population, but
not from aﬄuent blacks.
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groups. We find that the interests of the whites and the creamy layer blacks are
opposed. In fact, while the whites are worse off as far as being assigned to the
skilled task is concerned, the creamy layer blacks are better off. In this context it is
interesting that in the US, for example, Feagin and Porter (1995) discuss instances
where whites opposed to affirmative action have formed coalitions with like-minded
members of the black community (though they do not specify if these whites allied
specifically with creamy layer or poor blacks). This suggests that affirmative action
policies may require the creamy layer to gain in size, so that they can add their voice
in favour of such action.
1.1 Literature Review
The literature closest to ours is the one on statistical discrimination, pioneered by
Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973).14 The central idea behind statistical discrimination
is that individual attributes are not perfectly observable, so that employers use group
attributes in making their decisions. The idea of statistical discrimination was further
developed by Coate and Loury (1993), who use it to analyze the effect of affirmative
action on stereo-types. Most strikingly, they find that affirmative action can lead to
patronization whereby the target group can be held to a lower standard vis-a-vis the
non-target group.
Turning to the theoretical literature,15 Moro and Norman (2003) examine affir-
mative action in a framework where wages are endogenously determined, finding
that affirmative action may improve the investment level by the discriminated work-
ers in the worst equilibrium. Fryer (2007) examines firms with a hierarchical labour
structure, showing that if an employer discriminates against a group of workers in
her initial hiring, she may actually favor successful members of that group when she
promotes from within the firm. Fang and Norman (2006) show that in the presence
of racial discrimination in public sector jobs, members of discriminated groups may
be better off in that they acquire a greater level of investment. Finally, Lundberg
14The literature on bias/discrimination has also explored some related ideas. Becker (1957)
develops a theory of employment discrimination grounded in preference-based discrimination. In
related work, Welch (1976) studies sector specific employment quotas in a taste-based framework.
Theories of bias can also be based on perception, e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), and
Banerjee et al. (2009).
15There is a large empirical literature on affirmative action which has examined, among other
issues, the effect of affirmative action on improving black-white earning disparity. One can mention,
among many others, Leonard (1984), Smith and Welch (1984), Welch (1989), etc. In the Indian
context, one can mention Hnatkovska et al. (2012) and Deshpande and Ramachandran (2014),
among others.
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(1991) examines the impact of affirmative action when regulators do not observe the
firms’ personnel policies, while Fryer and Loury (2013) examines the effect of group
identity being observable on the efficacy of diversity-enhancing policies.
The present paper contributes to this literature by analyzing income heterogeneity
among the target group, and studying the interactions between identity-based stereo-
typing, and features that generate higher costs of education for poor blacks (such
as credit market imperfections). Further, we then use this framework to examine
several issues of interest that have been relatively unexplored in the literature, e.g.
a switch to income based affirmative action, among others.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the
framework analyzed in this paper and study the outcome without any affirmative
action. Section 3 examines the outcome when identity-based affirmative action is
present, comparing it with the outcome in the absence of any affirmative action.
While section 4 considers class-based affirmative action, in section 5 we examine the
implications of replacing identity-based with class-based affirmative action. Finally,
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Framework
We consider an economy divided along both identity and class lines, comprising
three kinds of workers, λW white workers, λ1 creamy layer black and λ2 poor black
workers, and a large number of firms. The number of workers is normalised to 1, so
that λW + λ1 + λ2 = 1. Let λB denote the proportion of blacks in the population,
and λR the proportion of the non-poor, so that λB ≡ λ1 + λ2, and λR ≡ λW + λ1. All
agents are risk neutral.
The workers are randomly matched to firms, with all workers finding a match.
Following the matching process, the firms assign workers to either of two tasks, 1 or
2, where task 1 requires skill, whereas task 2 does not. In task 1, the payoff of the
principal is xq (> 0) if the worker is skilled, and −xu (< 0) otherwise. Further, task
1 carries a positive wage of w, where w < xq. In task 2 on the other hand, both the
wages and returns are normalised to zero.
For all groups, acquiring the requisite skill is costly. This cost is c for the white
and creamy layer blacks, and cm (where m > 1) for poor blacks, where c is id-
iosyncratic and distributed over [0,∞) according to the distribution function G(c)
(and density function g(c)), where G(c) is continuously differentiable and identical
for all three groups. That poor black workers face higher costs could be because
of several reasons. It could possibly reflect the fact that a poor black worker get-
ting skilled may be forced to either give up working altogether, or take up a rel-
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atively low paying job during this skill acquisition period, as either taking up a
job at all, or taking up jobs with higher pay may not leave enough time to get
skilled. In either case there will be a loss of income, something that may be rel-
atively costlier for the poor (as it makes consumption smoothing harder).16 Al-
ternatively, this could arise because with imperfect credit markets, the poor black
workers may face higher interest rates in the credit market if they want to fund
skill acquisition. In fact there is some evidence that poor students of colour take
on more debt, and at higher interest rates, than their counterparts (according to
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/news/2013/05/16/63533/borrowers-
of-color-need-more-options-to-reduce-their-student-loan-debt/). Finally, it could be
because her environment adversely affects a poor black worker’s ability to get skilled.17
For every worker assigned to firms, the firms can observe group identity, but
they cannot observe whether the worker has acquired the necessary skill. The firms
however do observe a signal regarding their skill level. The signal s, where s ∈ [0, 1],
has distribution Fq(s) if the agent is qualified (i.e. acquired the requisite skill),
and Fu(s) if the worker is unqualified. Both Fq(s) and Fu(s) are twice continuously
differentiable so that the associated density functions, fq(s) and fu(s) respectively,
are well defined and continuous for all s. Finally, let
φ(s) =
fu(s)
fq(s)
,
be well defined for all s, and positive for all 1 > s > 0. The signal is informative in
that a higher s signals that the agent is more likely to be qualified. This is formalised
as
Assumption 1. φ(s) satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property (henceforth
MLRP), i.e. φ(s) is decreasing in s. Further, it satisfies the Inada conditions
lims→0φ(s) =∞ and lims→1φ(s) = 0.
We then specify the utility function of the firms, as well as the workers. The
16Carter and Lybbert (2012), for instance, show how financially constrained households in Burk-
ina Faso could not smooth consumption during periods of income loss.
17One such cost could arise because the poor blacks may lack role models. As argued by Allen
(1995) and Chung (2000), this could be because role models may provide critical information to
poor black workers, as well as mentor them, apart from acting as a source of inspiration. For creamy
layer black workers this issue can be less important, since with greater income, and consequently
greater access and homogenization, they may possibly draw their role model from among the whites
as well.
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payoff to a firm from a worker assigned to task 1 equals{
xq −w, if the worker is skilled,
−xu −w, otherwise,
and equals zero if the worker is assigned to task 2.
Next consider the utility of a worker. Letting the subscript i denote group iden-
tity, and noting that ci = c for whites and creamy layer blacks (i = W,1), while
c2 = cm for poor blacks, the utility of a group i worker with cost of ci is
w− ci, if she is skilled and assigned to task 1,
−ci, if she is skilled and assigned to task 2,
w, if she is unskilled and assigned to task 1,
0, otherwise.
The timeline is as follows. Nature moves first, choosing the level of c for every
worker. The workers themselves get to observe their own level of c, but the firms
do not. Then the workers decide whether to acquire the skill required for task 1, or
not. In the next stage the workers are matched to firms, when a firm gets to observe
a signal regarding the skill level of a worker assigned to it. Finally, the firms decide
on task allocation.
2.1 Equilibrium in the Absence of any Affirmative Action
We first analyze the benchmark case in the absence of affirmative action. Note that
in this case the outcomes for the three groups can be examined separately.
The firms’ decisions: Consider a firm facing a worker of group i who emits a
signal s. If the firm believes that a proportion pii of the workers in this group are
skilled, then the firm’s belief that this particular worker is skilled, conditional on the
signal s, is given by
B(pii, s) ≡ piifq(s)
piifq(s) + (1− pii)fu(s)
. (1)
Hence the firm assigns this worker to task 1 if and only if the expected profits from
doing so exceed the profits from assigning her to task 2 (which is normalised to zero),
i.e. B(pii, s)(xq −w) − (1− B(pii, s))(xu +w) ≥ 0, i.e.
r ≡ xq −w
xu +w
≥ 1− pii
pii
φ(s). (2)
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Given assumption 1, the firms’ decision is characterised by a cutoff si such that all
workers with a signal greater than si are assigned to task 1, where, for all pii < 1, si
is well defined and solves:
r ≡ xq −w
xu +w
=
1− pii
pii
φ(si). (3)
From MLRP it follows that si is decreasing in pi. Consequently the graph of si(pi),
call it EE, is negatively sloped in s− pi space.
Let ρi(si, pii) denote the probability that a randomly drawn worker from group i
is assigned to task 1, given that the cutoff signal for this group is si, i.e.
ρi(si, pii) = pii[1− Fq(si)] + (1− pii)[1− Fu(si)]. (4)
The workers’ decision: Next consider the decision problem facing a worker of type
i, who believes that firms will assign her to task 1 if and only if she emits a signal
of si, or higher. Note that acquiring the skill increases a worker’s chances of getting
assigned to task 1, as she is more likely to send a signal greater than si. Letting β(s)
denote the increase in expected gross income from skill acquisition, we can write
β(s) ≡ w(Fu(s) − Fq(s)). It is straightforward to check that β(0) = β(1) = 0, so
that G(β(0)) = G(β(1)) = 0. Further, given MLRP, G(β(s)) ≥ 0 and increasing if
and only if φ(s) > 1. This in turn implies that G(β(s)) is single-peaked, attaining a
maximum value at some s˜ > 0, so that G(β(s)) is increasing if and only if s < s˜.
First consider white and CLB workers. Such a worker with cost c acquires the
skill if and only if w(1− Fq(si)) − c ≥ w(1− Fu(si)), i.e. the cost of skill acquisition
c ≤ β(s) ≡ w(Fu(s) − Fq(s)), (5)
the expected gain from doing so. Recalling that c has a distribution G(c), the
proportion of type i workers getting educated pii equals the proportion of workers
with cost less than β(si), so that
pii = G(β(si)), i = 1,W. (6)
Given that G(β(s)) single peaked at s˜ and increasing if and only if s < s˜, the graph
of pii(si) in the s− pi space, call it WWi, i = 1,W, is inversely U-shaped.
Recalling that for a poor black worker of type c the cost of skill acquisition is
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cm, we can mimic the preceding argument to write (denoting β^(s) ≡ β(s)
m
)
pi2 = G(β^(s2)). (7)
Note that WWW coincides with WW1, and that WW2 lies below WWi, i = W,1.
Further, note that both curves peak at s˜.
As shall be clear shortly, this economy allows for multiple equilibria. For ease
of exposition we impose assumption 2 below that helps us focus on the equilibria of
interest.18 To that end we define r˜ as solving
G(β^(s˜)) =
φ(s˜)
r+ φ(s˜)
.
Assumption 2. (a) r > r˜.
(b) There exists a unique s ′′′ > s˜ such that EE intersects WW2 from above.
(c) There exists no s > s˜ such that EE intersects WWi, i = 1,W from above.
Assumption 2(a) ensures that there is a unique s ′ < s˜ (resp. s ′′ < s˜) such that
EE and WWi, i = 1,W (resp. EE and WW2) intersect (see Figure 1). We then
identify conditions such that a configuration < s¯i, p¯ii, ρ¯i >, where < s¯i, p¯ii, ρ¯i >≡
(s¯W, p¯iW, ρ¯W ; s¯1, p¯i1, ρ¯1; s¯2, p¯i2, ρ¯2) constitutes an equilibrium. Moreover, note that for
all (pij, sj), where sj ∈ {s ′, s ′′, s ′′′} and (pij, sj) belongs to the graph of EE, we have
that pij > 0.
In the absence of affirmative action, a configuration < s¯i, p¯ii, ρ¯i >, where ρ¯i =
ρi(s¯i, p¯ii), constitutes an equilibrium if and only if, for all groups i = 1, 2,W, (a)
given the cutoff s¯i, the proportion of group i workers acquiring the skill level is p¯ii,
and (b) given the level of skill acquisition p¯ii, a cut-off of s¯i maximises firm profits,
i.e.
pii = G(β(s(pii))), i = 1,W, (8)
pi2 = G((β^(s(pi2)))). (9)
18In an earlier version of the paper we did not impose assumption 2. This does not change the
analysis qualitatively, but makes some of the definitions substantially more involved, and conse-
quently makes the analysis less transparent.
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As in much of the theoretical literature on affirmative action, we shall be inter-
ested in two classes of equilibria, those with and without stereo-typing.
We say that an equilibrium does not involve stereo-typing if (a) the creamy layer
blacks are held to the same standard as the white workers, and (b) whereas the
poor black workers may be held to a higher standard, this arises solely from their
relatively higher cost of acquiring education. Thus, given assumption 2 and Figure
1, one can say there is a unique stereo-typing equilibrium < s¯i, p¯ii, ρ¯i > that involves
s¯W = s¯1 = s
′, and s¯2 = s ′′.
An equilibrium is said to involve stereo-typing if the poor black workers are held
to a standard that is ‘too’ high vis-a-vis the white workers. From assumption 2
and Figure 1, there is a unique stereo-typing equilibrium < s¯i, p¯ii, ρ¯i > that involves
s¯W = s¯1 = s
′, and s¯2 = s ′′′.19,20
(Figure 1 about here.)
Remark 1. Given assumption 2, there is a unique stereo-typing, as well as a unique
non-stereo-typing equilibrium. The preceding definitions would get more involved if
assumption 2 is not imposed. Consider, for example, the stereo-typing equilibrium.
If, say assumption 2(b) is not imposed, then there could be multiple stereo-typing
equilibria and one would require an equilibrium selection mechanism among all such
equilibria. One possibility is to impose the condition that the selected stereo-typing
equilibrium satisfy, in addition, the property that there exists no other stereo-typing
equilibrium with a lower cutoff for the poor black workers. Similar equilibrium selec-
tion issues would arise if assumption 2(c) is not satisfied. Finally if 2(a) is violated,
then, given 2(c), there exists no s < s˜ such that EEi, i = 1,W intersects WW from
above.
3 Identity Based Affirmative Action
We then introduce the notion of identity based affirmative action formally and define
equilibria in the presence of such affirmative action. We begin by identifying two
political problems that may possibly aﬄict affirmative action policies. First, unlike
in Coate and Loury (1993), we find that the removal of affirmative action can worsen
19Note that we focus on equilibria that are locally stable in that the absolute value of the slope
of EE exceeds that of WWi. For ease of exposition we shall refer to locally stable equilibria simply
as equilibria.
20In an earlier version of the paper, that did not impose assumption 2, we allowed for the fact
that there could be multiple equilibria with stereo-typing, focusing on equilibria that involved the
‘least’ stereo-typing as a selection device. This does not change the analysis qualitatively.
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labour market outcomes for all poor black workers. Further, the interests of the
whites and the creamy layer blacks may be opposed, in that while all creamy layer
black workers prefer that affirmative action be adopted, the utility of all white work-
ers decreases in that case. In Section 5 later, we compare the equilibrium outcome
under such policies with that under class-based affirmative action.
Let P(s ′i, pii) denote an employer’s expected payoff from assigning a worker be-
longing to group i who emits a signal s ′i to task 1:
P(s ′i, pii) = pii[1− Fq(s
′
i)](xq −w) − (1− pii)[1− Fu(s
′
i)](xu +w). (10)
We consider an identity-based affirmative action policy that involves mandating
that the proportion of workers assigned to the skilled task, i.e. task 1, be the same
for the black and the white workers, i.e.
ρW = µ1ρ1 + µ2ρ2, (11)
where µi =
λi
λ1+λ2
, i = 1, 2.
We then use (4) to define the functions
ρ^(s) ≡ ρ(s,G(β(s)), and ^^ρ(s) = ρ(s,G(β^(s))),
that will play an important role in the analysis. For i = 1,W, for example, ρ^(si)
denotes the fraction of group i workers that will be assigned to the skilled task when
the employers adopt a cutoff of si for this group, and the workers respond optimally
to this cutoff so that G(β(si)) workers in this group invest in skill acquisition. Note
that ρ^(0) = ^^ρ(0) = 1 and ρ^(1) = ^^ρ(1) = 0.
Assumption 3. ρ^(s) and ^^ρ(s) are negatively sloped.21
From Coate and Loury (1993) recall that in the absence of any income hetero-
geneity, given assumption 3, affirmative action completely resolves the problem of
stereo-typing (in the sense that the resulting equilibrium not only involves no stereo-
typing, it can moreover be sustained even after affirmative action is withdrawn). In
21In terms of model primitives, that ρ^(s) is negatively sloped can equivalently be written as
fu(s)−fq(s)
fu(s)
< 1
G(β(s))+g(β(s))β(s) , ∀s, and that ^^ρ(s) is negatively sloped can equivalently be written
as
fu(s)−fq(s)
fu(s)
< 1
G(β^(s))+g(β^(s))β^(s)
, ∀s. If, for example, (a) c is uniformly distributed over [0, 1],
so that g(.) = 1, (b) fu(s) = 2 for all s ∈ [0, 1/2] and fu(s) = 0, ∀s ∈ (1/2, 1], (c) fq(s) = 1 for all
s ∈ [0, 1], and (d) w < 1, then it is straightforward to check that the conditions both hold.
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the present paper also this assumption plays a somewhat similar role, allowing us to
abstract from issues of patronisation (to be defined in Section 5.1 later on). Given
that Coate and Loury (1993) has studied the problem of patronisation extensively, to
begin with we focus on equilibria without patronisation so that the various trade-offs
can be analysed without any possible confounding effects arising out of patronisation,
demonstrating that even in that case several results of interest emerge. In Section
5.1 later, we shall examine the outcome when assumption 3 is relaxed so that the
equilibrium may involve patronisation.
We next turn to solving for equilibria in the presence of affirmative action. Be-
cause of affirmative action considerations, the employers’ decisions in the various
markets now become inter-linked, so that the constrained optimisation problem of
an employer is:
max
s ′1,s
′
2,s
′
W
∑
i=W,1,2
λiP(s
′
i, pii) + γ[µ1ρ1(s
′
1, pi1) + µ2ρ2(s
′
2, pi2) − ρW(s
′
W, piW)], (12)
where γ is the Lagrange multiplier on the affirmative action constraint. The first
order condition with respect to s ′i generates the cutoff si as a function of pii. Denoting
this function by EEi(γ), i = 1, 2,W, we have
xq −w− γ/λW
xu +w+ γ/λW
= 1−piW
piW
φ(sW) : EEW(γ), (13)
xq −w+ γµ1/λ1
xu +w− γµ1/λ1
=
xq −w+ γ/λB
xu +w− γ/λB
= 1−pi1
pi1
φ(s1) : EE1(γ), (14)
xq −w+ γµ2/λ2
xu +w− γµ2/λ2
=
xq −w+ γ/λB
xu +w− γ/λB
= 1−pi2
pi2
φ(s2) : EE2(γ). (15)
These conditions are intuitive, showing that as a result of affirmative action, em-
ployers act as if they have to pay a tax of γ
λW
on each white worker assigned to task
one, while receiving subsidies of γ
λB
on each creamy layer and poor black worker they
assign to task one.
Comparing with (3), where recall that (3) involves r = 1−pii
pii
φ(si), we have the
following observation (see Figure 2):
Observation 1. Let assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Fix γ > 0.
(a) For any si, the pii solving (13), is greater than the pii solving (3), so that
graphically EEW(γ) lies to the right of EE.
(b) From (14) and (15), EE1(γ) and EE2(γ) coincide.
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(c) For any si, the pii solving (14) (as well as (15)) is less than the pii solving (3),
so that EEi(γ), i = 1, 2, both lie to the left of EE.
(Figure 2 about here.)
An outcome < s∗i , pi
∗
i , ρ
∗
i >≡ (s∗W, pi∗W, ρ∗W ; s∗1, pi∗1, ρ∗1; s∗2, pi∗2, ρ∗2) constitutes an equi-
librium with affirmative action if and only if, ∀i = W,1, 2, (a) given the cutoff s∗i ,
the proportion of group i workers acquiring the skill level is pi∗i , (b) given the level
of skill acquisition pi∗i , a cut-off of s
∗
i maximises firm profits, (c) ρ
∗
i = ρi(s
∗
i , pi
∗
i ), and
(d) the affirmative action constraint (11) is satisfied. Formally, < s∗i , pi
∗
i , ρ
∗
i > should
satisfy
pii = G(β(s(pii))), i = 1,W, (16)
pi2 = G(β^(s(pi2))), (17)
ρW = µ1ρ1 + µ2ρ2. (18)
Let γ∗ denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with this equilibrium. We
shall restrict attention to equilibria that are locally stable, so that for all i, EEi(γ
∗)
intersects WWi from above, and moreover, for i = 1,W, EEi(γ
∗) intersects WWi
from above exactly once, and EE2(γ
∗) intersects WW2 from above exactly twice.
Proposition 1 below establishes that there is an open set of parameter values such
that an equilibrium with affirmative action exists. Given Proposition 1 below, we
shall henceforth focus on equilibria with a positive Lagrange multiplier. The proof
can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 1. Let assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold.
(a) There exists an open set of parameter values m such that an affirmative action
equilibrium with a positive Lagrange multiplier exists.
(b) There can be at most two equilibria under affirmative action, one where s∗2 < s˜,
call it equilibrium without stereo-typing, and another where s∗2 > s˜, call it
equilibrium with stereo-typing.
We then establish some further properties of equilibria under affirmative action.
The proof is in the Appendix.
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Proposition 2. Let assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Denote the non-stereotyping equi-
librium in the absence of affirmative action by < s¯i, p¯ii, ρ¯i >. Under any affirmative
action equilibrium < s∗i , pi
∗
i , ρ
∗
i > one has that:
(a) s¯W < s
∗
W, s¯1 > s
∗
1, s¯2 > s
∗
2,
(b) ρ¯W > ρ
∗
W, ρ¯1 < ρ
∗
1, ρ¯2 < ρ
∗
2,
(c) ρ∗1 > ρ
∗
W > ρ
∗
2,
(d) s∗2 > s
∗
W > s
∗
1.
3.1 Comparing Equilibria with and without Affirmative Ac-
tion
We next compare the outcome under affirmative action with that in the absence of
any affirmative action, in particular we examine how the imposition of affirmative
action affects the utility of the workers belonging to the various groups. Proposition
3 below will play a critical role in answering this question. It demonstrates that
while comparing across two different equilibria, it is sufficient to keep track of the
cutoff signals across the two equilibria. Any group that faces a lower cutoff signal
under one of these equilibria, strictly prefers that equilibrium to the other one.
Proposition 3. Consider two distinct equilibria, < s ′i, pi
′
i, ρ
′
i > and < s
′′
i , pi
′′
i , ρ
′′
i >.
Every individual in group i prefers < s ′i, pi
′
i, ρ
′
i > to < s
′′
i , pi
′′
i , ρ
′′
i > if and only if
s ′i < s
′′
i .
Proof. For ease of exposition, let us denote < s ′i, pi
′
i, ρ
′
i > by E1, and
< s ′′i , pi
′′
i , ρ
′′
i > by E2. We divide the individuals in group i into two classes.
(a) First consider group i individuals who take the same decision regarding skill
acquisition under both equilibria, i.e. they either acquire the skill under both E1
and E2, or refuse to do so under both equilibria. Given that their level of skill is the
same under both equilibria, they prefer E1 over E2 since, given that s ′i < s
′′
i , they
have a greater chance of being assigned to task 1 under E1.
(b) Next consider individuals whose skill acquisition decision change across the
two equilibria. Let ui(c, x, s, Ej) denote the utility of a group i individual with cost c
under equilibrium Ej facing a cutoff signal of s, and taking a skill acquisition decision
x ∈ {Y,N}, with Y (resp. N) denoting that she decides to acquire (resp. not acquire)
the skill.
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(i) First, consider individuals who acquire the skill under E2, but not under E1.
Then
ui(c,N, s
′
i, E1) ≥ ui(c, Y, s ′i, E1) (19)
> ui(c, Y, s
′′
i , E2), (20)
where the first inequality follows from a revealed preference argument and the second
inequality from the fact that s ′i < s
′′
i . Thus this individual is strictly better off under
E1.
(i) Next, consider individuals who acquire the skill under E1, but not under E2.
Then
ui(c, Y, s
′
i, E1) ≥ ui(c,N, s ′i, E1) (21)
> ui(c,N, s
′′
i , E2). (22)
Thus all group i workers are strictly better off under E1 relative to E2.
Note that the argument in Proposition 3 does not depend on whether there is any
affirmative action policy in place or not, or on whether the affirmative action policy,
if any, is identity, or class based. Thus we shall invoke this result while comparing
across class and identity based affirmative action policies as well.
The next proposition suggests two political problems that may possibly aﬄict
affirmative action policies. First, Coate and Loury (1993) argue that if assumption
3 holds and there is no heterogeneity in income, then all equilibria under affirmative
action will lead to homogenous beliefs regarding the skill level of the various groups,
so that removal of an affirmative action policy will not generate any change in the
outcome. Consequently, temporary affirmative action policies can have a permanent
effect (see their Proposition 2). Unlike Coate and Loury (1993) however, the removal
of affirmative action can lead to a lower utility for all poor black workers in the
current framework. This suggests that once enforced, affirmative action policies may
be difficult to remove as doing so might lead to a significant loss of utility for the poor
black workers, and consequently be politically unacceptable. Further, in Proposition
5(b) later, we shall argue that this is more likely to happen when the poor blacks
are relatively ‘large’ in number. if so, then removing such affirmative action becomes
even more difficult given that a significantly large section of the population is going
to be adversely affected.
Second, we argue that with the implementation of affirmative action policies,
while the creamy layer black workers are better off, white workers are worse off. Given
that both these groups are likely to have significant voice in the political process, the
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implementation of such policies could be potentially problematic. Taken together,
these two results demonstrate the importance of allowing for income heterogeneity
within the target group.
Proposition 4. Let assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold.
(a) If the affirmative action equilibrium involves no stereo-typing, then all poor
black workers will be worse off if affirmative action is removed.
(b) The utility of all creamy layer black workers is greater under affirmative action,
while the utility of all white workers is lower.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium in the absence of affirmative action, < s¯i, p¯ii, ρ¯i >.
Note that under either the stereo-typing, or the non-stereo-typing equilibrium, s¯W =
s¯1 < s¯2. Given assumption 2, we have that ρ¯W = ρ¯1 > ρ¯2, so that the affirmative
action constraint (11) is not satisfied in either equilibrium.
(a) Note that the affirmative action constraint necessarily binds. Otherwise,
the equilibrium will coincide with either the stereo-typing, or the non-stereotyping
equilibrium, so that the affirmative action constraint cannot be satisfied. Given that
the affirmative action constraint binds, we have that the Lagrange multiplier under
affirmative action, call it γ∗, must be positive. Next, given that the equilibrium under
affirmative action involves no stereo-typing, from Observation 1, it now follows that
s∗2 < s¯2 < s˜, so that s2 will increase once affirmative action is removed. The result
then follows from Proposition 3.
(b) From the preceding argument the Lagrange multiplier under affirmative action
must be positive. Given that γ∗ > 0, from Observation 1 it then follows that s¯1 > s∗1,
and that s¯W < s
∗
W. From Proposition 3 we have that the creamy layer blacks prefer
that affirmative action happens, while the whites prefer that it does not.
Given Proposition 4(a), it is natural to ask if one can find conditions such that
any equilibrium under affirmative action is without stereo-typing, so that removal of
affirmative action policy necessarily leads to a decline in utility for the poor black
workers. We need the following assumption before going further.
Assumption 4. For all γ ≥ 0, the maximal s such that EEW intersects WWW from
above is less than s ′′′′.
Given this assumption, we find that the only equilibrium under affirmative action
is non-stereo-typing whenever poor black workers form a significantly large fraction
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of all black workers. We recall from Proposition 4(a), in that case all poor black
workers are necessarily worse off if affirmative action is removed. From Figure 1
recall that s ′′′′ is the minimum s such that EE intersects WW2 from below.
Proposition 5. Let assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 hold. Fixing λB, there exists λ^2 ≤ λB,
such that for all (λ1, λ2) satisfying λB ≥ λ2 ≥ λ^2 and λ1 = λB − λ2, there exists no
affirmative action equilibrium with stereo-typing. In that case all poor black workers
will be worse off if affirmative action is removed.
Proof. We first prove that such an λ^2 exists. Suppose λ2 = λB, and suppose to the
contrary a stereo-typing equilibrium where s∗2 > s˜ exists. By Observation 1, s
∗
2 > s
′′′′.
Whereas by Observation 1 and assumption 4, s∗W < s
′′′′. Given assumption 3, the
affirmative action constraint cannot be satisfied and no stereo-typing equilibrium
exists. The existence of λ^2 then follows from continuity. Consequently, for all λ2 ≥ λ^2,
all poor black workers will be worse off if affirmative action is removed.
4 Class Based Affirmative Action
We next introduce class based affirmative action policy. As discussed earlier, class-
based policies are being debated, and even adopted in many countries across the
world in some sectors. In this section we define the notion of equilibrium under such
a policy, before examining the implications of switching from an identity based to
class based affirmative action policy in the following section.
A class based affirmative action policy mandates that the weighted average of the
proportion of white and creamy layer black workers being assigned to task 1, equal
that of the poor black workers. Defining λ ′′1 =
λ1
λR
and λ ′′W =
λW
λR
, where λR ≡ λ1+λW,
the class-based affirmative action condition is formally given by:
ρ2 = λ
′′
1 ρ1 + λ
′′
WρW. (23)
Note that under a class based affirmative action policy not only are the white and
creamy layer black workers at par as far as the cost of getting skilled is concerned,
but the class based affirmative action policy also treats these two groups identically.
Hence, in order to bring out the essential issues more sharply, we shall focus on
symmetric equilibria where the cutoff signals and the extent of skill acquisition is
the same across the two groups, i.e. s1 = sW, pi1 = piW and ρW = ρ1. Thus the class
based affirmative action condition can be re-written as:
ρ2 = ρ1 = ρW. (24)
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An outcome< s∗∗i , pi
∗∗
i , ρ
∗∗
i >, where< s
∗∗
i , pi
∗∗
i , ρ
∗∗
i >≡ (s∗∗W , pi∗∗W , ρ∗∗W ; s∗∗1 , pi∗∗1 , ρ∗∗1 ; s∗∗2 , pi∗∗2 , ρ∗∗2 ),
constitutes an equilibrium with class-based affirmative action if and only if, ∀i =
W,1, 2, (a) given the cutoff s∗∗i , the proportion of group i workers acquiring the skill
level is pi∗∗i , (b) given the level of skill acquisition pi
∗∗
i , a cut-off of s
∗∗
i maximises firm
profits, (c) ρ∗∗i = ρi(s
∗∗
i , pi
∗∗
i ), and (d) the class-based affirmative action constraint is
satisfied, i.e. ρ∗∗2 = ρ
∗∗
1 = ρ
∗∗
W .
Next, mimicking the earlier analysis, the optimisation problem of a firm yields
the following first order conditions:
xq −w− γ/λR
xu +w+ γ/λR
=
1−pi∗∗W
pi∗∗W
φ(s∗∗W) : EEW(γ), (25)
xq −w− γ/λR
xu +w+ γ/λR
=
1−pi∗∗1
pi∗∗1
φ(s∗∗1 ) : EE1(γ), (26)
xq −w+ γ/λ2
xu +w− γ/λ2
=
1−pi∗∗2
pi∗∗2
φ(s∗∗2 ) : EE2(γ). (27)
For ease of exposition we continue to use the notations EEi(γ) for this case as well.
Clearly under class-based affirmative action, EE1(γ) and EEW(γ) coincide, and both
lie above EE, whereas EE2(γ) lies below EE. As in case of identity-based affirmative
action, we shall restrict attention to equilibria that are locally stable, and more-
over, for i = 1,W, EEi(γ
∗∗) intersects WWi from above exactly once, and EE2(γ∗∗)
intersects WW2 from above exactly twice.
Proposition 6. Let assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold.
(a) There exists an open set of m such that a class-based affirmative action equi-
librium with a positive Lagrange multiplier exists.
(b) There can be at most two equilibria under class based affirmative action, one
of which involves s∗∗2 < s˜, which we call a non-stereo-typing equilibrium, and
another which involves s∗∗2 > s˜, which we call a stereo-typing equilibrium.
(c) Under any equilibria the poor blacks face a lower cutoff compared to the other
groups, i.e. s∗∗2 < s
∗∗
1 = s
∗∗
W .
Proof. (a) Given continuity, the argument follows from Proposition 1 in Coate
and Loury (1993).
(b) One can mimic the argument in Proposition 1(b) to argue that there can be
at most two equilibria, one where s∗∗2 < s˜, and another where s
∗∗
2 > s˜.
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(c) We note the affirmative constraint ensures that ρ∗∗1 = ρ
∗∗
2 = ρ
∗∗
W . The claim
now follows since, ∀s, ^^ρ(s) < ρ^(s), and from assumption 3 both ^^ρ(s) and ρ^(s) are
negatively sloped.
We then argue that in the presence of assumption 4, there is a unique equilibrium
that does not involve stereo-typing, and moreover, in that case, all poor black workers
will be worse off if affirmative action is removed.
Proposition 7. Let assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 hold.
(a) There can be at most one equilibrium under class based affirmative action, one
that involves no stereo-typing equilibrium.
(b) While all poor black workers will be worse off if class-based affirmative action
is removed, both the white and the creamy layer black workers will be better off.
Proof. (a) Suppose to the contrary there is an equilibrium where s∗∗2 > s˜. Then,
given assumption 4, it must be that s∗∗2 > s
∗∗
1 = s
∗∗
W , so that the affirmative action
constraint cannot be satisfied.
(b) Given that the class-based affirmative action constraint binds, it must be that
the associated Lagrange multiplier is strictly positive. Consequently from Proposi-
tion 7(a) and Observation 1 it follows that s∗∗2 < s
′ < s∗∗1 = s
∗∗
W . The result follows
since recall that in the non-stereo-typing equilibrium, denote it by < s¯i, p¯ii, ρ¯i >,
s¯W = s¯1 = s
′ and s¯2 = s ′′, where recall that s ′′ > s ′.
Taking Propositions 5(b) and 7(b) together, we find that irrespective of whether
affirmative action is identity or class-based, removing affirmative action may lead to
a loss in utility for the poor blacks. This in turn may make removal of any such
policy politically difficult, especially if poor black workers form a significantly large
section of the black population.
5 Comparing Identity and Class Based Affirma-
tive Action
Next we consider the implications of switching from an identity-based to a class-based
affirmative action policy. Proposition 8 below demonstrates that, relative to identity
based affirmative action, all creamy layer black workers are worse off under class
based affirmative action. Moreover, all poor black workers are better off, whereas
the white workers are worse off under a class-based policy.
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We need the following regularity condition before proceeding further. We later
discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption.
Assumption 5. 1−G(β(s))
G(β(s))
φ(s) and 1−G(β^(s))
G(β^(s))
φ(s) are both decreasing in s for all s.22
The next result compares identity based affirmative action policy with a class-
based one.
Proposition 8. Let assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 5 hold. All poor black workers are
better off, whereas all white, as well as all creamy layer black workers are worse off
in the event of regime switch from identity to class based affirmative action.
Proof. Let < s∗i , pi
∗
i , ρ
∗
i > denote an equilibrium under identity based affirmative
action, while < s∗∗i , pi
∗∗
i , ρ
∗∗
i > denotes an equilibrium under class-based affirmative
action.
To begin with note that s∗∗1 > s
∗
1 (this follows as EE1(γ) shifts down under
identity-based affirmative action, and shifts up under class based affirmative action).
This implies that ρ∗1 > ρ
∗∗
1 (from assumption 3).
We next argue that ρ∗∗2 > ρ
∗
2. Suppose to the contrary that ρ
∗∗
2 ≤ ρ∗2. This implies
that s∗∗2 ≥ s∗2 (from assumption 3). Given (15), (27) and the fact that 1−G(β^(s))G(β^(s)) φ(s)
is decreasing in s, this implies that γ∗ ≥ γ∗∗. This then implies that s∗∗W ≤ s∗W (from
(13), (25) and the fact that 1−G(β(s))
G(β(s))
φ(s) is decreasing in s), and hence ρ∗∗W ≥ ρ∗W
(from assumption 3).
Next, given that ρ∗∗2 = ρ
∗∗
1 = ρ
∗∗
W , we have that
ρ∗∗W = µ1ρ
∗∗
1 + µ2ρ
∗∗
2 .
Thus,
ρ∗W ≤ ρ∗∗W = µ1ρ∗∗1 + µ2ρ∗∗2 < µ1ρ∗1 + µ2ρ∗2,
which contradicts the affirmative action constraint under identity-based affirmative
action. Hence, ρ∗∗2 > ρ
∗
2, and thus s
∗∗
2 < s
∗
2 (from assumption 3). This in turn
implies that γ∗ < γ∗∗ (mimicking our earlier argument), so that from Observation 1
22For 1−G(β(s))
G(β(s)) φ(s) to be decreasing for all s, it is necessary and sufficient that
G(β(s))(1−G(β(s)))(f ′u(s)fq(s)−f
′
q(s)fu(s))
wg(.) < fu(s)fq(s)(fu(s) − fq(s)). This condition is sufficient
to ensure that 1−G(β^(s))
G(β^(s))
φ(s) is decreasing for all s. If, for example, (a) fu(s) = 2 for all s ∈ [0, 1/2]
and fu(s) = 0, ∀s ∈ (1/2, 1], and (b) fq(s) = 1 for all s ∈ [0, 1], then it is straightforward to check
that this condition holds.
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and assumption 3, ρ∗∗W < ρ
∗
W. Thus from assumption 2, s
∗∗
W > s
∗
W. The result now
follows from Proposition 3.
Intuitively, under class based affirmative action, the creamy layer black workers
no longer belong to the target group, unlike under identity based affirmative action.
Consequently, these workers face relatively higher standards and are worse off under
class based affirmative action. This implies that the poor blacks would be better off
as well, since otherwise the shadow price of equality must be lower when affirmative
action is based on income, rather than on identity. A lower shadow price of equality,
in turn, would imply that the standards for the whites would be higher under identity-
based affirmative action, so that they would be worse off. This, however, violates the
identity-based affirmative action constraint, as both creamy layer and poor blacks
cannot be better off under identity-based affirmative action, while the whites are
worse off. Thus, class-based affirmative action increases the shadow price of equality,
making poor blacks better off, and whites worse off.
How restrictive is assumption 5? We next argue that this assumption is auto-
matically satisfied whenever poor black workers constitute a significant fraction of
all black workers and assumption 4 holds. Note that 1−G(β(s))
G(β(s))
φ(s) and 1−G(β^(s))
G(β^(s))
φ(s)
are both necessarily decreasing for all s < s˜. Thus, even in the absence of this as-
sumption, the preceding proposition goes through whenever all equilibria involves
cutoff signals that are less than s˜. From Proposition 5 earlier, we recall that for any
λ2 ≥ λ^2, it is the case that any equilibrium under identity-based affirmative action is
a non-stereo-typing equilibrium. Further, from Proposition 7 earlier, recall that any
equilibrium under class-based affirmative action must be non-stereo-typing. Thus,
for all λ2 ≥ λ^2, all equilibria under either form of affirmative action are non-stereo-
typing, so that 1−G(β(s))
G(β(s))
φ(s) and 1−G(β^(s))
G(β^(s))
φ(s) are both decreasing over the relevant
range and Proposition 8 goes through.
Proposition 8 suggests that a move from identity based to class based affirmative
action may face political hurdles, as both the whites, as well as creamy layer blacks,
groups with significant voice would be worse off as a result of such a move. Moreover,
while white workers are worse off under both types of affirmative action, they may be
relatively more willing to support identity-based, rather than class-based affirmative
action policies. This is interesting given that most countries start with identity based
affirmative action.
22
5.1 Patronizing Equilibria
Finally we introduce the notion of patronization first developed in Coate and Loury
(1993). We find that even under a patronizing equilibrium, the creamy layer black
workers are worse off in case of a move from identity to class-based affirmative action,
and the interests of the whites and the creamy layer blacks are going to be opposed.
To that end we examine an economy where ρ^(s) and and ^^ρ(s) are non-monotonic.
Assumption 6. Let ρ^(s) and ^^ρ(s) be both increasing over some interval (s, s¯), where
0 < s < s¯ < 1.
We next define the notion of a patronizing equilibrium under identity based affir-
mative action, as one where firms have correct beliefs about the inferiority of the poor
blacks and therefore use a lower standard to ensure that poor blacks are assigned to
task 1 at a large enough rate to ensure that the affirmative action constraint is being
met.
An equilibrium < s∗i , pi
∗
i , ρ
∗
i > under identity based affirmative action is said to
be patronizing if and only if s∗2 < s
∗
W.
An equilibrium < s∗∗i , pi
∗∗
i , ρ
∗∗
i > under class based affirmative action is said to be
patronizing if and only if s∗∗2 < s
∗∗
i , i = 1,W.
Note that for m = 1, our framework coincides with Coate and Loury (1993).
Consequently, from continuity, Proposition 4 in Coate and Loury (1993) guaran-
tees the existence of a patronising equilibrium under both identity as well as class
based affirmative action for an open set of parameter values (that requires λW to be
sufficiently large) for m sufficiently close to 1.
In the next proposition we examine the effects of a switch from identity-based to
class-based affirmative action in the presence of patronization. Interestingly, under
a patronising equilibrium we find that interests of the poor black and the white
workers are necessarily opposed as far as labour market outcomes are concerned,
though the effects on these two groups, relative to the affirmative action policy, are
ambiguous. Consequently, class-based affirmative action is unlikely to have much
political backing whenever the poor black workers actually gain in the labour market,
as both the whites and creamy layer blacks would then be worse off.
Proposition 9. Let assumptions 1, 2, 5 and 6 hold, and suppose that a patronising
equilibrium exists under both identity based, as well as class based affirmation action.
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(a) The creamy layer black workers are worse off under class based affirmative
action.
(b) The interests of the whites and the poor black workers are opposed in the sense
that white workers are better off under class based affirmative action if and only
if the poor black workers are worse off.
Proof. Mimicing the argument in Proposition 8, note that s∗∗1 > s
∗
1. Further, if
γ∗∗ ≥ γ∗, then s∗∗2 ≤ s∗2 and s∗∗W ≥ s∗W from Observation 1. Whereas if γ∗∗ < γ∗, then
s∗∗2 > s
∗
2 and s
∗∗
W < s
∗
W.
Intuitively, the reason for creamy layer blacks being worse off under class-based af-
firmative action is the same as for Proposition 8. Turning to the poor black and white
workers, if the poor blacks are worse off (respectively better-off) under class-based
affirmative action, then the shadow price of equality must be lower (respectively
higher), so that the whites must be better off (respectively worse off).
6 Conclusion
We examine affirmative action in a framework with statistical discrimination, as well
as income heterogeneity among the beneficiaries of affirmative action. We then use
this framework to examine a set of questions that are of importance to the countries
practicing affirmative action.
We find that attempts to roll back affirmative action policies can be problematic.
The presence of income heterogeneity means that - unlike in Coate and Loury (1993)
- removal of affirmative action may worsen labour market outcomes for poor blacks,
so that temporary affirmative action may not have a permanent effect. This finding
suggests that once affirmative action is in place, it might be politically very difficult to
remove such policies. A case in point could be India, where all major political parties
are careful to support the continuation of affirmative action policies.23 Relatedly one
finds that in the US, as universities in many states began to limit their use of race-
based affirmative action policies, minority enrolment in these universities dropped,
and segregation increased, which is consistent with our results.24
We then examine another politically charged issue - how moving to class-based af-
firmative action affects the three groups. Our findings indicate that such a transition
23Affirmative action, which was supposed to be phased out within 10 years, is now continuing for
over 60 years in India.
24http://www.nyu.edu/classes/jackson/social.issues/papers/AfActGrG.html.
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could be politically divisive, with at least two of the three groups, which necessarily
includes the creamy layer blacks, losing out in the labour market as a result. If
there is no patronization in equilibrium, then such a transition would make the poor
blacks better off, but hurt both the whites and the creamy layer blacks in the labour
market.
Taken together, these results suggest that affirmative action is politically an ex-
tremely sensitive issue, particularly in the presence of income heterogeneity. Given
the complexities of the trade-offs involved, implementation is going to be as much
as a political challenge as an economic one, and will require serious and sustained
efforts at consensus building.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. (a) Define s^i as solving
s^i(γ) = {min si|si lies at the intersection of EEi(γ) and WWi}.
Note that s^1(0) = s^W(0)(= s¯1 = s¯W). Further, given r > r˜, it is the case that
s^i(0) < s˜, i = 1,W. Moreover, from assumption 2, s^2(0) = s¯2 < s˜. Note that
s¯1 = s¯W < s¯2, so that from 3 one has that ρ^(s¯1) > ρ^(s¯2). Consider any r > r˜, and m
such that 1 < m < m˜(r). To show that there exists γ∗(r,m) > 0, such that s^i(γ∗)
satisfies affirmative action.
Let γ increase from zero. Note that s^i(γ) is continuous, with s^1(γ), s^2(γ) being
decreasing, and s^W(γ) being increasing in γ. Next define
D(γ) = µ1ρ^(s^1(γ)) + µ2ρ^(s^2(γ)) − ρ^(s^W(γ)).
Note that
D(0) = µ1ρ^(s^1(0)) + µ2ρ^(s^2(0)) − ρ^(s^W(0))
= µ1ρ^(s¯1) + µ2ρ^(s¯2) − ρ^(s¯W)
= µ2ρ^(s¯2) − (1− µ1)ρ^(s¯1) (since s¯1 = s¯W)
= µ2(ρ^(s¯2) − ρ^(s¯1)) < 0,
where the last inequality follows from assumption 3 and the fact that s¯1 = s¯W < s¯2.
Further, as γ → λB(xu +w), for i = 1, 2, s^i(γ) goes to zero (from 1), so that ρ^(si)
goes to 1, and consequently [µ1ρ^(s^1(γ)) + µ2ρ^(s^2(γ))]|γ→λB(xu+w) = 1. Given that
ρ^(s^W(λB(xu +w)) < 1, we have that D(γ)|γ→λB(xu+w) > 0. Consequently, given that
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D(0) < 0, from the continuity of D(γ) there exists γ∗ > 0 such that D(γ∗) = 0.
(b) Consider an affirmative action equilibrium < s∗i , pi
∗
i , ρ
∗
i >, with an associated
Lagrange multiplier of γ∗. Note that the affirmative action constraint implies that
in this equilibrium ρ∗W = µ1ρ
∗
1 + µ2ρ
∗
2. Any other affirmative action equilibrium
must involve a different γ ′, where without loss of generality let γ ′ > γ∗. Then from
Observation 1, the affirmative action constraint cannot be satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 2. (a) Note that Proposition 2(a) follows from Observation
1 (see Figure 2).
(b) Given Proposition 2(a), Proposition 2(b) follows from the fact that ρ^(s) is
negatively sloped (from 2).
(c) and (d) Observe that from Proposition 2(a), s∗W > s¯W = s¯1 > s
∗
1. Hence given
assumption 2, ρ^(s∗1) > ρ^(s
∗
W). Further given that (a) ρ^(s
∗
1) > ρ^(s
∗
W), and (b) from
the affirmative action constraint, ρ^(s∗W) equals the average of ρ^(s
∗
1) and ρ^(s
∗
2), we
have that ρ^(s∗W) > ρ^(s
∗
2). Next, given ρ^(s) is decreasing, s
∗
2 > s
∗
W > s
∗
1.
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